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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record as a part of my remarks a most informative article appearing in the July 18 issue of U.S. News & World Report entitled "What's 'CIA'?"

This interview with Adm. William F. Raborn, retiring head of CIA, is most informative, especially as to the scope of CIA's operations and how it is directed, supervised, and controlled by the President of the United States, various agencies of the executive department of the Government, as well as the Congress of the United States.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the U.S. News & World Report, June 18, 1966]

WHAT'S "CIA"?—INTERVIEW WITH ADM. WILLIAM F. RABORN, RETIRING HEAD OF AMERICA'S MOST SECRET AGENCY

(NOTE.—Once more, the Central Intelligence Agency—CIA—finds itself a center of controversy.)

(Congress is studying a proposal to broaden its control and surveillance of the wide-ranging intelligence organizations.)

(Now questions are raised. Just what is CIA? What does it really do—and not do? Does anybody know all its secrets, control its activities?)

(In this exclusive interview, the man who headed Central Intelligence this past year takes readers of "U.S. News & World Report" behind the scenes of CIA, describes its workings in detail.)

Question. Admiral Raborn, what is the specific charter of the Central Intelligence Agency within the intelligence community?

Answer. The National Security Act assigned five functions to the Agency:

Continued

To advise the National Security Council—and of course the President—on intelligence matters relating to national security;

To co-ordinate all foreign-intelligence activities of our Government;

To produce and disseminate finished national intelligence within the Government;

To undertake what we call "services of common concern"—that is, functions which serve all the components of the intelligence community and can best be undertaken centrally;

And finally, to perform such other services as the National Security Council may direct.

That is as specific as the Congress wanted to be. That fifth assignment is the Agency's charter for clandestine activities, and you will notice it puts CIA directly under the control of the President's National Security Council.

Question. The emphasis appears to be on information gathering. Wouldn't it be more palatable and just as accurate to call it the "Central Information Agency"?

Answer. Our principal responsibility is to gather, specifically, that information which relates directly to national-security problems and objectives. The United States Information Agency deals with information in the broader sense of the term, and distributes it outside the Government. It is useful both to their operations and to ours to preserve this distinction.

There is a further point in our professional terminology: "Intelligence," as we use the term, refers to information which has been carefully evaluated as to its accuracy and significance. The difference between "information" and "intelligence" is the important process of evaluating the accuracy and assessing the significance in terms of national security.

Question. You just referred to "finished national intelligence." What is that in your terminology?

Answer. When a raw report has been checked for accuracy, and analyzed and integrated with all other available information on the same subject by competent experts in that particular field, we call it "finished intelligence." When, in addition, it represents the conclusions of the entire intelligence community, then it is "national intelligence." In short, we find that we need a terminology which can be more precise and more limiting than the broad concept of "information."

Question. People seem to have the impression that the CIA is a big spying organization—that it is staffed almost entirely by spies. Is there anything to that impression?

Answer. This, of course, is the popular view of any intelligence organization, but it is highly distorted. Our job is to keep the top officials of the U.S. Government informed of what is happening around the world that may affect the national security of the United States.

Of course, much of the world's area and population is under a closed society, run by governments that seek to conceal their activities and their objectives. They may be hostile to us, and some classical espionage is required to give timely warning of when and how these activities and objectives might threaten us. But, to maintain proper perspective, let me point out that a great deal of the raw information is public, or available with a certain amount of digging.

The principal role of an intelligence organization is to take what is overt and what is secret and bring expert knowledge, background information, and scholarly analysis to bear in a way which has nothing in common with the heroes of modern spy fiction.

Question. Could you give us the proportions between the analysts at home and the men in the field overseas who are collecting this information?

Answer. We don't publish these figures, or even rough proportions, because the information would be of great use to the opposition, but I can tell you this much: The man who joins CIA has far less chance, in the course of his career, of identifying with James Bond or "The Spy Who Came In From the Cold" than he does of serving as an academic researcher, economist, scientist, statistician, administrator, accountant, or supply officer.

Question. Another idea is that the CIA is stirring up insurrections, or starting and maybe running little wars—

Answer. This again is a misconception. Our major business is national intelligence, and so-called covert operations are a relatively minor part of our over-all activities. The Government, after all, is organized on a pretty logical basis: The Department of State is in charge of foreign policy and foreign relations; running wars would be the business of the Defense Department; CIA has enough to do getting, coordinating, and disseminating intelligence without running any wars.

Question. The National Security Act of 1947 envisages a field of clandestine activities, however, where the CIA will play a role which cannot be undertaken by State, or Defense, or other overt agencies of the United States Government. Do you have a free hand there?

Answer. Absolutely not. Any such activities are by direction of the National Security Council. To be precise, they must have the prior approval—in detail—of a committee of the NSC on which top-ranking representatives of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense meet with the Director of Central Intelligence for this purpose. These gentlemen see to it not only that every activity of the CIA is completely in consonance with the established policies and objectives of the United States, but that it is also advantageous to the United States.

Question. With that approval, are you free to operate as you wish in the field? Would the U.S. ambassador in the country concerned know about your activities there?

Answer. Like other U.S. officials abroad, CIA's overseas personnel are subordinate to the U.S. ambassadors. We are certainly not in competition with other U.S. representation abroad—we complement and supplement the "country team" approach of the embassy to official U.S. activities. We operate with the foreknowledge and approval of the ambassador.

Question. But some of our ambassadors have denied any prior knowledge of activities which are known to be, or at least suspected of being, CIA operations—

Answer. Conceivably there might be an instance where the Department of State in Washington would have reasons for not informing the ambassador. Normal policy is to have him informed.

Question. Does the ambassador receive your intelligence in the field, or does he have to get it from Washington?

Answer. It is made available in the field to the ambassador and designated members of his staff. If the ambassador wishes, he also gets the ultimate finished evaluation from headquarters, along with intelligence on other countries which may be of interest to him. The Department of State may also send to its embassies and legations the finished intelligence reports prepared by CIA.

Question. You and your predecessors have stated, as have the President and Secretary Rusk, that CIA does not make policy, but the accusation persists. Could this be because your information contributes to policy decisions?

Answer. To maintain that record, let me say again flatly that CIA does not make policy, and does not operate outside or contrary to established policy. Now, certainly

nobody would expect the top officials of a government to make their decisions without considering all available information. It is the mission of CIA to provide the most accurate, the most comprehensive, and the most objective information available about matters which interest our Government, together with whatever we can learn or project about possible impending developments. In specific answer to your question, put the emphasis on "objective" information.

Question. But this information does play a part in the decisions of Government—

Answer. The top officials of the Administration, and for that matter, the legislators, obviously find it useful, because there is a constant increase in the demand for our current intelligence and our projective estimates. Let me point out that there is one unique contribution the CIA makes to Government officials facing a choice between alternative possible courses of action. Precisely because the CIA does not commit itself to any one choice among the alternatives, our intelligence input is free from partisanship or advocacy, and recognized by the recipients as objective.

Question. Isn't it true that much of the information you gather isn't really secret at all, but would be available to anybody in the right spot at the right time?

Answer. Yes. In fact, a considerable part of the information used by the Agency in preparing its finished intelligence reports is derived from the foreign press and radio, from technical journals of foreign countries, and from official publications of these countries. We don't disregard information simply because it is not secret. Finished intelligence, however, consists of the expert correlation and interpretation of all the information we can obtain, by both overt and clandestine means.

#### CIA'S BROAD INTERESTS

Question. Do you gather information about domestic events in foreign countries, as well as the operations of foreign governments?

Answer. Our interests and responsibilities may vary from country to country, but they are pretty comprehensive. It is obviously impossible to confine yourself to a nation's foreign affairs if you are responsible, for instance, for assessing the stability of the regime, the health of the economy, or the prospects for subversion in the backwoods.

Question. Do you collect information of a business nature?

Answer. We collect economic information which may be useful to the security interests of the U.S. Government—and we collect it exclusively for that purpose.

Question. Do you have to cover every corner of the whole world?

Answer. Of course we have priorities, but our intelligence requirements are worldwide. Our top Administration officials need factual and unbiased intelligence on a timely basis as one of the many elements which go into the decisions they have to make. At a minimum, we have to have certain basic information on hand about virtually every country in the world. Country X—you name it—might appear remote and totally unrelated to our national security, but it is nevertheless impossible to state with certainty that detailed information about country X will not become necessary to our Government on a crash basis some day.

Question. How detailed?

Answer. The basic information on foreign countries which is compiled in what we call the National Intelligence Surveys already adds up to more than 10 times the size of "The Encyclopedia Britannica." Much of this information, of course, is hardly secret. It has to cover such prosaic matters as economic statistics, legal codes, sociological conditions and transport facilities, but it comes in handy when our customers start playing "20 Questions."

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Question. At what point do you feel that this type of information—the basic data, the information which is open to the public—should be reported back on a running basis to our Government—as fast as you get it?

Answer. This goes back to the distinction between information and intelligence—and the needs of our Government. If everything is quiet, there may be an occasional situation report based largely on open information. If the situation has a direct relation to U.S. national-security interests, particularly in a crisis, we will be trying to get as close to "real time" reporting as modern communications permit.

Question. Is the information which you collect interpreted by somebody on the scene, or does it reach you in raw form so that you can sort out the facts from the opinions?

Answer. We require the original report, or the original statement of the primary source, whenever we can get it. When this "raw material" reaches us, it may be accompanied by the opinions and interpretations of intermediaries through whom the information has passed, and by the informed comment and preliminary evaluation of our own collectors in the field, but these additions are clearly labeled as such.

Question. How do you co-operate in the field with the other elements of your intelligence community? Aren't CIA and State and the military-intelligence people all looking for much the same information?

Answer. Our finished national intelligence derives from the work of all of the elements of the intelligence community. Foreign Service officers provide the Department of State with political intelligence, commercial attachés are responsible for economic information, the military attachés send military intelligence to their respective services, and, for that matter, there are agricultural attachés and labor attachés. All of them provide departmental intelligence for the specific needs of specific departments. All of these reports are also available to CIA.

The Agency has been added to supplement and expand the collection and fill any gaps. It has a broader charter for all types of intelligence necessary in the national interest, and—as I mentioned at the outset—the added statutory responsibility to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for . . . appropriate dissemination."

For example, a piece of political intelligence from one country and the Army attaché's report from another country may add up to a conclusion of major significance to the National Security Council, or specifically to the Atomic Energy Commission. It is CIA's responsibility to see to it that the two halves do get added up in Washington to make the whole, and furthermore that the finished evaluation reaches the department which needs it.

#### CONTROLS ON INTELLIGENCE

Question. But how do you avoid duplication of effort in the field?

Answer. The United States Intelligence Board, which represents the entire intelligence community, establishes guidelines and priorities for the intelligence-collection effort. This machinery can control unnecessary duplication, but when you are after the closely guarded information that affects our national interest, duplication of effort is often desirable rather than unnecessary.

Question. Are the State and military-intelligence people operating under handicaps, in comparison to CIA, in obtaining information?

Answer. You have to take into consideration, firstly, that the collection of intelligence is not the primary responsibility of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, and, secondly, that the representa-

tives they send abroad must operate in the open as recognized officials of the U.S. Government. In effect, CIA often is in better position to obtain necessary intelligence because CIA is specifically organized for this kind of collection and can give it first priority.

If, by handicaps, you mean the obstacles which foreign governments place in the way of intelligence collection, foreign governments make every effort to preserve their essential secrets, just as we do. Year by year, security procedures become more sophisticated and harder to circumvent, so that skill and specialization are even more necessary. On the other side of the coin, there are few, if any, countries in the world today which are as much of an "open society" as the United States.

Question. What about co-operation with the intelligence services of friendly countries? If we collect information which is important to one of our allies, is it passed to them?

Answer. I am not at liberty to go into detail, but wherever it is of mutual interest and advantage, there is substantial co-operation among the intelligence services of friendly countries.

Question. Does machinery exist to correlate all of the information that flows into Washington, and refine it into firm and useful conclusions?

Answer. Yes—specifically, the United States Intelligence Board, or USIB, which advises and assists the Director of Central Intelligence and is under his chairmanship. This Board meets every week, or more often if necessary, to co-ordinate the work of all of the intelligence components of the U.S. Government. It consists of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, who represents CIA so that the Director, as USIB chairman, will be uncommitted; the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director of the National Security Agency; an Assistant Director of the FBI; and the Assistant General Manager for Administration of the Atomic Energy Commission. The heads of Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence meet with the Board as observers.

USIB assigns intelligence priorities to see to it that there are no gaps in our coverage, and insures that the judgments which go forward to the President are finished national intelligence.

This job of correlation and co-ordination, however, starts long before the product reaches USIB for final review. More and more, as we develop and refine the concept of an intelligence community, the analysts and the specialists in one component are in constant touch and interchange with their opposite numbers in the other departments and agencies, so that the national-intelligence process begins as soon as the raw information reaches Washington, if not before.

As for moving from the raw information to a firm and agreed conclusion, in many instances this can be done by the expert analysts available, backed up by our storehouse of background knowledge. There will always, of course, be the "unknowables"—questions which have no definitive answers, possibly because the future is open to the effects of many variables, or because the future depends on decisions which certain foreign statesmen may not even have made yet. Who will succeed the Premier of country X? When and by whom will there be a coup in country Y?

Our Government leaders need and request our best answers on the "unknowables." This we do in our National Intelligence Estimates. From what we do know, the best thinking available in the entire intelligence community makes rational inferences about the unknown—with varying but specified de-

grees of confidence, and an occasional footnote reflecting an individual dissent from the agreed opinion.

Question. How many of these estimates do you produce?

Answer. It varies with the need. The Estimate is not a global periodical, on a weekly or daily basis; it addresses itself to the probable course of one development, or one country. Many of the Estimates come out with a scheduled frequency—annually, for instance if necessary. Some are produced in times of crisis in a matter of hours. All are geared to the intelligence needs of the top Government officials. All reflect the greatest possible professional skill and dispassionate objectivity we can bring to bear. CIA has no axe to grind, and does not permit itself to become advocate of a specific policy in preparing an Estimate.

All aspects of every Estimate get the fullest consideration, by the interagency working groups which begin the drafting, by the Board of National Estimates—a group of distinguished senior officers of long experience and proven competence in diverse fields of Government—and by the United States Intelligence Board. In the end, the National Intelligence Estimate is the report of the Director of Central Intelligence to the President and the National Security Council.

Question. Can this machinery operate fast enough to permit quick action when the flow of information suggests impending danger or trouble?

Answer. The process is extremely flexible. Conceivably, when the schedule permits, the draft of an annual Estimate might start two or three months before the target date, to permit comprehensive and deliberate consultation, reference to the field, and so forth.

On the other hand, the Board of National Estimates when required can complete what we call a "SNE"—a Special National Intelligence Estimate—in a matter of hours, as I said.

As for immediate intelligence on current developments, we are geared to receive information, evaluate it, produce intelligence and react 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Nobody in the Agency, from the analyst to the Director, is guaranteed a night's uninterrupted sleep, or an unbroken week-end.

#### WORKING WITH THE FBI

Question. As we understand it, the Central Intelligence Agency does not run clandestine operations of any kind within the United States. Is that left entirely to the FBI?

Answer. The CIA has the responsibility for conducting operations outside the country; the FBI has as its principal mission the internal security of the United States and its possessions.

There is, of course, close co-operation and considerable interplay between our organizations, because we are combatting an international conspiracy whose operations and agents move back and forth between this country and foreign nations. The FBI and CIA therefore work very closely together and keep each other intimately informed on items of potential interest or concern to each other. This allows us to combat international conspiracy in the most effective possible manner.

The division of responsibility for clandestine operations, of course, should not be confused with the perfectly overt contacts CIA has domestically—for example, with experts in the professional world to discuss international situations and exchange analyses.

Question. Do you work largely in a vacuum, with little or no contact with the rest of the Government outside the intelligence community?

Answer. By no means. It is inherent in the concept of a Central Intelligence Agency that

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any branch of the Government which has a legitimate need for information can call on us for it. By the same token, when we need expertise to help us in evaluation, or in the accomplishment of any of our missions, we will not hesitate to go anywhere in the Government or outside it, within the limitations of security, where we might expect to find the necessary help. But our closest ties, of course, are within the intelligence community, and to the top officials of the executive branch.

Question. What form do your intelligence reports take?

Answer. We disseminate finished intelligence in an infinite variety of formats, tailored to specific purposes. I reported frequently in person, of course, to the President and to the National Security Council. I have mentioned the Estimates, and our "55-foot shelf" of basic background information.

In addition, we have daily, weekly and monthly publications, some global in scope, some for a specific country or crisis. When the situation is truly critical, I have on occasion ordered situation reports as often as every hour on the hour, around the clock. Then there are individual memoranda which give us great flexibility in scope, format, deadlines and distribution. And we also turn out studies in depth which are the equivalent of a scholarly book or a doctoral dissertation. Various publications have dissemination lists, depending on their sensitivity and purpose, which range from less than half a dozen copies to hundreds.

Question. What is the "ancestry" of the CIA in U.S. intelligence activities? Does it operate differently from its predecessors?

Answer. The Agency grew from the need to establish a centralized and objective intelligence organization in peacetime. A primary impetus, of course, was the experience of Pearl Harbor, and the determination to insure against such surprises in the future.

The requirement for a centralized organization stemmed from the successful experience during World War II of the Office of Strategic Services under General Donovan. The requirement was made all the more real by the threat posed by an evangelistic international Communism which became readily apparent shortly after the close of World War II. There was general agreement within the Government that there was need for a non-partisan co-ordinating agency in the intelligence field. As a result, the CIA was created in 1947.

In some respects the Office of Strategic Services of World War II was our ancestor, but it did not have CIA's responsibility for co-ordinating the work of the entire intelligence community, or our requirement for across-the-board coverage.

Question. Does CIA have anything that might be called regulations to govern its activities? Who prescribes them?

Answer. Is there a Government agency nearly 20 years old that doesn't have a rule book? Start with the original legislation, which spells out the mission of CIA and provides that we function at the behest and under the control of the President and the NSC. Under that charter, CIA is governed by several layers of regulations known as the "Nonseks," or National Security Council Intelligence Directives; the DCID's, or Director of Central Intelligence Directives, issued by the Director in his capacity as chairman of USIB, and head of the intelligence community; and finally, as in the case of any other governmental component, CIA's own Agency regulations.

#### HELP FROM "BEST BRAINS"

Question. Do you have any counsel or advisers outside the Government?

Answer. We have several panels of technical experts, both inside and outside the

Government, to keep us informed on new developments and techniques which could be of use to us. On these panels are the best brains in this country, on virtually the entire range of human endeavor. We contract for studies and research projects, wherever in the United States these can best be performed.

CIA has long made it a practice to discuss its evaluations of the international situation with top men in the civilian world. We have done a great deal of this, but we must do still more. One of my last acts with the Agency, for instance, was to order even greater interchange with the nongovernmental experts on China.

Question. Have you found that the sporadic criticism, among the lines that spying is a devious business and that CIA operates without any control, has made people reluctant to work with you?

Answer. I have found no measurable reluctance on these grounds, although there is always the more general concern of the academic world that governmental funds and governmental projects must not be accompanied by unwelcome controls or commitments. On the whole, patriotic citizens in all walks of life are glad to work with us in serving the national-security interest. The intelligence community finds this very gratifying, because it helps us give the President, the executive branch, and the legislative branch the very best judgments that the best minds in this country can arrive at.

#### "UNDER FULL SCRUTINY"

Question. Is there any other Administration control of your operations besides the special National Security Council committee you mentioned?

Answer. The CIA and its activities have been reviewed in detail in the past by Hoover Commission task forces, the Doolittle Committee, the Clark Committee, and several special investigating bodies for specific purposes. On a permanent basis, the entire intelligence community is under continuing and full scrutiny by a most knowledgeable and distinguished board of private citizens appointed by the President. This is the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, first established in January of 1956 as the Killian Committee, and now under the chairmanship of Mr. Clark Clifford. The present membership includes Dr. William O. Baker of Bell Telephone Laboratories; Mr. Gordon Gray, former Special Assistant to President Eisenhower and onetime president of North Carolina University; Prof. William Langer of Harvard; Gen. Maxwell Taylor; Ambassador Robert Murphy, former Under Secretary of State; Mr. Frank Pace, Jr., former Secretary of the Army and former Director of the Bureau of the Budget; Dr. Edwin Land, head of the Polaroid Corporation; Adm. John Sides, USN (ret.); and Mr. Augustus Long, formerly the top executive of the Texas Company.

This Board meets in full session about every six weeks, to examine in depth and detail the work and the progress of the entire U.S. intelligence program. The meetings last two or three days and include comprehensive discussions with the Director and his senior officers, heads of other intelligence components, and senior officials of the Government who are our "customers."

Upon completion of each such session, the Board reports to the President and makes recommendations for the improvement of the intelligence effort. In addition, the Board has a number of two-man or three-man panels and subcommittees to delve more deeply and on a full-time basis into specific aspects and categories of intelligence work.

Question. What about control of your funds?

Answer. The Central Intelligence Agency budget is reviewed fully by the Bureau of the Budget, which requires the same assurances and justifications for expenditures by intelligence agencies that it requires from any other part of our Government. We are not immune from detailed examination of our requests by the Bureau, nor are we exempt from its skillful pruning knife.

We have to go to Congress for our funds, just like other agencies. The only difference is that, after our requests have been approved by certain special congressional subcommittees, the specific appropriations are then lumped in for passage with other appropriations, to deny hostile intelligence services information about our activities which would be very useful to them. We have meticulous auditing procedures to insure the tightest possible control over the expenditure of funds entrusted to the CIA.

Question. In light of the recurring arguments about a so-called "watchdog committee" for CIA, how much information does Congress actually get—not your intelligence reports, that is, but information about your activities, your budget, and so on?

Answer. Ever since CIA was first established, the Director has been authorized and in fact directed to make complete disclosure of CIA activities to special subcommittees in both the Senate and House.

In the House, the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee each have a special subcommittee for this purpose.

In the Senate, there are corresponding subcommittees which usually meet jointly.

In addition, the Director reports regularly to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy on intelligence matters in that field.

Now, when I say "complete disclosure," I mean complete—and frequent. The CIA is completely responsive to their questions, no matter how sensitive. I have discussed matters with these special subcommittees which are so sensitive that only a small percentage of the personnel in CIA have access to them. And in case there is any suggestion that these meetings are sporadic and casual: In my first 12 weeks as Director I found that I was called to 17 meetings with these congressional committees. Our legislative log for the year 1965 shows that the Director or his senior aides met a total of 34 times with the four special subcommittees.

Question. Are they the only Congressmen who receive information from CIA? Intelligence, that is, as opposed to operational matters?

Answer. No, there were also 19 other committee hearings in 1965, for instance, to obtain substantive intelligence from CIA—and some of these hearings ran as long as three full days to cover the intelligence appreciation of the global situation. We also frequently brief individual members of Congress.

Let me make this distinction clear: I had authority to brief any congressional committee having a jurisdictional interest on substantive global intelligence. But discussion of CIA activities, methods, and sources is another matter. Public Law 80-253 of 1947—that's the National Security Act—makes the Director of Central Intelligence exclusively responsible for protecting the security of the sources and methods of the entire intelligence community. I was authorized by the President and by National Security Council directives to discuss such matters only with the special subcommittees designated for this purpose, not with any others.

## PROTECTING CIA AGENTS

Question. What is the reason for this limitation?

Answer. It is not arbitrary or bureaucratic—we are safeguarding the lives of trusted agents and our own staff people all over the world who contribute to our Government's intelligence objectives.

We owe it to them to take every precaution to protect them—and we owe it to our Government to deny hostile intelligence services even indirect hints or the slightest clues which might enable them to take steps to blunt our intelligence operations, methods and sources.

Question. Do you mean it is a question of security leaks?

Answer. I prefer to say inadvertent disclosure. Even a professional intelligence officer has to be alert to draw the line between information which helps to evaluate or authenticate a piece of raw intelligence, and information which might point to the source or the method we used to obtain it. The more people who have both types of information, the more you multiply the chance that somebody will overstep that line by accident.

Question. How damaging can such disclosures be?

Answer. Well, the minute you even hint that you have information the other fellow has been trying to keep secret, it is one of the first principles of the art that he will do everything possible to locate and destroy your source, or disrupt your method of operation. If the opposition is given any clues to help pinpoint the source, the counterintelligence job is that much easier.

## INFORMATION FOR CONGRESS

Question. Have the special CIA subcommittees in Congress expressed any dissatisfaction over the years that they were not getting enough information?

Answer. We have never withheld any information, substantive or operational, from the four special subcommittees. On some occasions, in fact, they have asked us not to give them the identities of very sensitive sources, because they did not wish to know, and we have complied. If you refer to dissatisfaction with the amount of information which we have—rather than the amount we give them—no professional intelligence operation anywhere in the world is ever satisfied with the extent of its knowledge, and these gentlemen have been working with us long enough so that they have probably acquired this same professional dissatisfaction.

Question. What about the effect of the criticism on your own personnel?

Answer. I think it is an eloquent testimonial to the dedication of the people in CIA that the criticism has not affected their morale. Bear in mind that, by our rules, they cannot answer, deny, or refute the adverse comment, even when it is patently and sometimes viciously false. Add to that the grave responsibilities for the nation's security, the pressure, the anonymity of achievement, and the constant need for security alertness—it is a source of pride, and nothing short of amazement, that we keep our people, and keep getting more good ones.

I asked recently for some statistics on how long our personnel had been with us. The answers showed that more than a quarter of our professional personnel—as differentiated from the clerical—had been with CIA more than 15 years, and that an astounding 77 per cent had 10 years or more of intelligence experience. About 15 per cent have graduate degrees; 5 per cent have the doctorate.

When you consider only the analysts who have the direct responsibility in headquarters for analysis of a foreign area, six out of 10 of them had lived, worked or traveled abroad even before they came to CIA. When you combine all the years required for gradu-

ate study, foreign experience, and then 10 to 15 years of intelligence work, it adds up to an impressive depth of knowledge, competence and expertise at the service of the nation.

I have been careful to stick to percentages, but in actual numbers, we could easily and adequately staff the faculty of a university with our experts. In a way, we do. Many of those who leave us join the faculties of universities and colleges. Some of our personnel take leaves of absence to teach, and renew their contacts with the academic world. I suppose this is only fair; our energetic recruiting effort not only looks for the best young graduate students we can find, but also picks up a few professors from time to time.

Question. What about the criticism that the CIA uses "dishonorable" methods? Do you operate on the principle that the CIA, as a participant in the cold war, is justified in adopting any measures that may be used by the opposing governments—"fighting fire with fire"?

Answer. Let's be quite clear in our minds that an adversary does not go by the Marquis of Queensberry rules. It is a rough fight, and the CIA may have to be clandestine from time to time, but I emphatically reject the word "dishonorable."

The men and women in CIA are, after all, Americans with the same ideals, the same ethics, the same moral codes as the rest of the nation. I have with me a copy of a remark Secretary Rusk made to a press conference last winter, which I would like to read into your record if I may:

"I would emphasize to you that CIA is not engaged in activities not known to the senior policy officers of the Government. But you should also bear in mind that beneath the level of public discussion, there is a tough struggle going on in the back alleys all over the world. It's a tough one, it's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is not a field which can be left entirely to the other side. And so, once in a while, some disagreeable things happen, and I can tell you that there is a good deal of gallantry and a high degree of competence in those who have to help us deal with that part of the struggle for freedom."

And President Johnson, when he swore me in as Director of Central Intelligence on April 28, 1965, put it this way:

"We have committed our lives, our property, our resources and our sacred honor to the freedom and peace of other men, indeed, to the freedom and peace of all mankind. We would dishonor that commitment, we would disgrace all the sacrifices Americans have made, if we were not every hour of every day vigilant against every threat to peace and freedom. That is why we have the Central Intelligence Agency."

Question. Just what are the duties of the Director of CIA?

Answer. The National Security Act of 1947 created the position of Director of Central Intelligence, or DCI, for short. The DCI is not only the Director of CIA—he is also first and foremost the principal adviser on foreign intelligence to the President and the National Security Council. And he is also chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, or USIB, which brings together the entire intelligence community.

Question. Now that you have just left the Central Intelligence Agency after more than 14 months as Director, what is your opinion of the Agency?

Answer. Excellent. It is the finest organization I have ever been associated with. The people at CIA are dedicated, loyal and highly capable. I found the Agency well up to its exacting requirements as our first line of national defense.

## AFTER DOMINICAN CRISIS

Question. Why are you leaving now?

Answer. When President Johnson called me out of retirement from Government service, I asked him first how long I would be needed. He told me I could serve six months, or a year, or as long as he was in office, or until I was satisfied with certain administrative tasks, including, in particular, long-range planning.

I'm taking the fourth option, but I also came close to the one-year hitch. Actually, the President had had my resignation in hand for about three weeks when he announced it. I came in with the Dominican crisis; and you might say it behooved me to stay until peaceful elections brought a duly constituted Government into being.

Question. Admiral Raborn, what are you going to do now?

Answer. I plan to take a short rest and then return to American industry with the Aerojet-General Corporation.